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The Disorders of Unrestricted Capital Mobility
and the Limits of the Orthodox Imagination: A
Critique of Robert Solomon, Money on the Move:
The Revolution in International Finance since
1980 (Princeton University Press, 1999).
Timothy A. Canova*
It has become increasingly difficult to claim economics as a
hard science. Such pretensions have floundered under a mountain of doubts about the course of global economic and financial
developments. Unlike the hard sciences, economics must deal
with conditions that are uncontrollable and theories that are
often impossible to verify or refute. While economics is unable
to predict events or to offer solutions with any degree of certainty, the discipline's pretensions as a value-neutral science
have often permitted orthodox economists to rely on flawed assumptions, and to continue offering explanations and prescriptions without any sense of humility for the possibilities of their
own errors.' In this way, orthodox economics continues to serve
as a vehicle for the dominant neoliberal ideology that glorifies
private markets while denigrating the efficacy of public-sector
development efforts.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. I
would like to thank Barbara Creel, Irwin Stotzky, Jennifer Moore, and Alfred
Mathewson for very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this review. I also
thank my editor Jon Lauck, and my research assistants, Travis Jackson,
Frederick Gooding, Jr., and Ernie C'DeBaca. This review is dedicated to
Nicholas P. Ciotola, friend, role-model, and loving uncle.
1.

JOHN

MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTER-

275, 297-98 (1964) (criticizing the "pseudo-mathematical methods of formalizing a system of economic analysis" that rests on flawed "initial
assumptions" which "lose sight of the complexities and interdependencies of the
real world in a maze of pretensions and unhelpful symbols"); Lynn Turgeon,
"Introduction," THE SEARCH FOR ECONOMICS AS A SCIENCE: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ix (ed. Lynn Turgeon, 1996) (warning against the increased
mathematization of economics and the deemphasis of the study of economic history). See also, James Boyd White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 161 (1987) (criticizing the scientific claims of economics);
Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, Symposium on Post-ChicagoLaw and
Economics, 65 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 23 (1989) (criticizing fundamental assumptions of law and economics school).
EST, AND MONEY
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The shortcomings in orthodox thinking have been amply
demonstrated in debates about cross-border capital flows and
the proper allocation of adjustment burdens. It was therefore
not surprising when Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan, at the 1999 annual meeting of the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), misidentified the nature of the global currency contagion and the cause of Japan's
continuing economic weakness as stemming from an insufficient
reliance on private capital markets. 2 With such orthodox and
flawed assumptions, Greenspan's solution for Japan and most
other troubled economies is that they open up further to private
capital inflows, a solution that neatly serves the interests of the
established orthodoxy. 3 Just a modicum of humility might suggest alternative explanations and prescriptions that are more
critical of today's neoliberal model of free capital mobility and
adjustment austerity for deficit countries.
Robert Solomon largely follows in this orthodox tradition,
accepting neoliberal assumptions and policy solutions. 4 At
2. Richard W. Stevenson, Greenspan Urges Japan to Widen Capital
Sources, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1999, at Cl. Greenspan argues that East Asian
countries lacked the spare tire of alternative non-banking sources of financing
(i.e., capital markets open to foreign hot money inflows). Remarks by Chairman
Alan Greenspan before the World Bank Group and the International Monetary
Fund, Program of Seminars, Washington, D.C., Sept. 27, 1999 <http://
www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/speeches/1999/199909272.htm>. But to the extent that East Asia's increasing reliance on private hot money capital inflows
actually contributed to the region's currency contagion, then a more appropriate metaphor would be that the region's tires were over-pumped, blew a hole,
and the air suddenly flowed out.
3. The Greenspan explanation fails to recognize that Japan has more in
foreign monetary reserves, stemming from accumulated trade surpluses, than
it could easily absorb in internal investment opportunities. Rather than scrambling to attract more inflows of fickle foreign hot money, Japan would do better
to find expanded outlets for recycling surpluses of monetary reserves through
transfers of public capital to less-developed countries. See Timothy A. Canova,
Banking and FinancialReform at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal Contagion,
14 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1571, 1636-41 (1999) (arguing in favor of changing the
burdens of adjustment from deficit to surplus countries by recycling surpluses).
4. For instance, Solomon has opposed monetary expansion as a means to
lift Japan out of recession: monetary expansion would "drive down the foreign
exchange value of the yen, thereby increasing Japan's already large current account surplus and causing problems for other countries, especially Japan's
Asian neighbors." Robert Solomon, Beggar my neighbor replayed in the 1990's,
Financial Times, Feb. 3, 1999, p. 14 (criticizing views of MIT economist Paul
Krugman). But such conclusions assume away the possibility of maintaining
the value of the yen while pursuing expansionary policies by selective use of
exchange and capital controls - a policy menu successfully pursued by Malaysia to the eventual embarrassment of orthodox economists at the International
Monetary Fund and the U.S. Treasury Department. Michael M. Phillips, IMF
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times, however, he also resembles someone caught in the transition between two worlds, trying to shake off the orthodoxy of his
past, but concerned with maintaining his credibility in those
same orthodox circles. 5 In Money on the Move: The Revolution in
InternationalFinanceSince 1980, Solomon has written a highly
descriptive account of some of the major developments in global
financial markets over the past two decades. 6 His impressive
compilation of events is couched in an objective, value-neutral
narrative, thereby suggesting that the tide of neoliberal policy
reforms is as inevitable as the sun rising. But lurking just beneath the surface are the usual neoclassical assumptions that
one might expect of a former chief international economist of the
Federal Reserve Board: that markets work best when free of
government restrictions; and that the best way for countries to
foster economic development is to attract private foreign invest7
ment-particularly short-term portfolio capital.
Solomon's acceptance of the dominant orthodoxy is suggested early in Money on the Move when he proclaims the success of the Bretton Woods Agreement's "larger purposes" of open
trade and freer movements of capital across national boundaries.8 But this portrayal of Bretton Woods appears rather constrained, given its commitment to such grand purposes as "the
promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and
real income."9 As Solomon is slow to mention, the Bretton
Woods Agreement expressly permitted member nations to impose controls on capital movements. 10 In fact, such capital controls were widely and successfully used over the decades to
Concedes That Malaysia's Controls Over Capital Produced Positive Results,
Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1999, at A21.
5. Solomon's departure from orthodoxy is suggested by his recognition of
the need for greater exchange rate stability and more rational adjustment
based on economic fundamentals rather than speculative pressures. Solomon,
infra note 6, at 22, 139, 142.
6. ROBERT SOLOMON, MONEY ON THE MovE: THE REVOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE SINCE 1980 (1999).
7. See Canova, supra note 3, at 1584-86, 1597-1609, 1636-41 (criticizing
capital account liberalization and inequitable adjustment burdens).
8. Solomon, supra note 6, at vii.
9. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27,
1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter Articles], Article I (ii).
10. In the closing pages of his book, Solomon admits: "The Bretton Woods
architects certainly did not envisage a world of free capital movements. Controls on capital movements were not only permissible but were probably expected to prevail by those who designed the IMF." Solomon, supra note 6, at
162. The tardy admission does not drive Solomon's analysis, but comes almost
as an afterthought during discussion of the IMF's continuing efforts to eviscerate capital controls as a policy tool.
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protect against speculative attacks and to provide the breathing
space by which Western Europe was able to achieve economic
takeoff."' But such re-writing of history is common: the IMF
itself routinely ignores both its original objective of full employment and the permissible means of capital controls, preferring
instead to perversely 12characterize free movement of capital as a
greater end in itself.
By organizing Money on the Move chronologically and geographically, Solomon's narrative often seems to lack a sufficient
analytical anchor or a penetrating critique of today's neoliberal
disorder. 13 For instance, in reporting on the wide-ranging fluctuations in the value of the U.S. dollar, Solomon delves into discussions about technical issues, such as the relative merits of
11. Canova, supra note 3, at 1612. In citing to an International Monetary
Fund (IMF) report that 119 out of 155 developing countries maintain some form
of control on capital flows, Solomon presents information without context. Solomon, supra note 6, at 163 n. 80. His recitation of fact begs the questions: what
are the qualitative characteristics of such control programs, and have such controls effectively protected countries from the hot money problem without scaring off long-term foreign direct investment?
12. Despite the mounting criticism of its role in exacerbating the global
currency contagion, the IMF remains committed to keeping capital account liberalization high on its agenda. Cf., Address by Michel Camdessus, Managing
Director of the IMF to the Board of Governors of the Fund, Washington, D.C.,
Sept. 38, 1999 <httpJ/www.imf.org/externallnp/speeches/1999/092899.HTM>
(urging support for an amendment to IMF Articles of Agreement to extend the
Fund's jurisdiction to capital account liberalization). There is plenty of reason
for skepticism about the IMF's recent lip-service indicating that its structural
adjustment programs are to be given an anti-poverty focus. Cf., Larry Elliott, A
Fund of wisdom rediscovered, The Guardian (London), Sept. 27, 1999. When
John Crow, the former Governor of the Bank of Canada and Chairman of the
IMF's external review team, spoke of the futility of promoting "democratic governance and social stability" while also promoting market-oriented reform and
structural adjustment, he was interrupted by laughter that apparently reflected the audience's utter disbelief in the effort itself. See Press Conference on
External Review of IMF Surveillance, Sept. 14, 1999 <http://www.imf.org/externa~lnp/tr/1999/TR990914.HTM>.
13. For example, Solomon compares U.S. and French policies during the
Reagan-Mitterand era: under both "the budget deficit and the balance-of-payments deficit increased." Solomon, supra note 6, at 5. But he misses the context by which private capital markets are increasingly able to intervene to
influence the political agenda: under Mitterand the franc took a nose-dive because investors (domestic and foreign) did not approve of the Keynesian-spending program of the French Socialists; while under Reagan the dollar rose in
value (despite the twin budget and trade deficits) because of a very anti-Keynesian monetary policy that sent U.S. interest rates soaring, a significant rise in
foreign speculation, and the fact that the U.S. dollar remains the main reserve
currency in the world. See Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S.
Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 Brook. L.Rev. 1295, 1322, 1326, 1353 (1995).
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central bank intervention and sterilization, 14 without adequately considering the underlying context of financial liberalization that has fueled private hot money and speculative capital
flows. 15 Largely missing from Solomon's narrative is an appreciation of the role of law in constructing the context and institutional framework of marketplace financial transactions,' 6 and
the relationship between law and the dynamics of power - social, political, and cultural - that contribute to a global financial regime that increasingly serves the interests of the few,
rather than the many. Far from a natural, inevitable phenomenon, the process of liberalization of capital accounts intimately
involves legal reforms and legal evasions - including the dismantling of national regulations and restrictions on the free flow
of capital between countries, and often resulting from widespread evasion of legal controls under the guise of "financial
17
innovation."
The neo-liberalization of legal constraints has necessarily
meant a huge increase in cross-border capital flows, and an increased dependence on certain volatile types of capital inflows most specifically, short-term portfolio investment (i.e., stocks
and bonds), often referred to as "hot money" capital flows because of the short-term nature of such investments, which can
be quickly liquidated, thereby transforming euphoric inflows
into panic-driven outflows and financial crisis with little or no
warning. The hot money problem, in turn, has undermined exchange rate stability, the effectiveness of central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets, and the feasibility of full
employment, while bringing on the global currency contagion
14. Solomon, supra note 6, at 14-18.
15. For instance, Solomon describes the details of the Brady Plan without
recognizing the significance by which it transformed the third-world's bank
debt burdens into a hot money problem. Id., at 46-47. While Solomon at times
recognizes the causal link between increased capital mobility and exchange rate
volatility, he treats such mobility as but one factor, largely secondary to the
"fundamentals" that necessitate painful adjustment for deficit countries. Id., at
150, 160 (calling for strengthened IMF loan conditionality).
16. For instance, Solomon favorably reports on the G-5 Plaza Agreement,
which concluded that exchange rates "should play a role in adjusting balances.
In order to do this, exchange rates should better reflect fundamental economic
conditions than has been the case." Id., at 22. But that is like wishing that
water will travel uphill: just how can exchange rates better reflect economic
fundamentals in the prevailing neoliberal environment in which governments
routinely dismantle restrictions on short-term hot money speculative capital
flows?
17. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance, supra note
13, at 1306-1308.
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that has decimated economies throughout much of the world, including Latin America, East Asia, and Russia.
To his credit, Solomon provides an excellent description of
the broad market trends, including the growing dependence of
developing countries on private hot money flows. But he also
overstates the benefits from hot money capital inflows, and understates the costs in terms of vulnerability to sudden capital
outflows and sharply rising rates of poverty and mass unemployment.' 8 His discussion of the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-1995,
however, does depart from the usual "blame-the-victim" discourse to reflect on recent criticisms of the Washington consensus and the IMF's program of liberalization of capital
accounts.' 9 But despite his awareness of critical perspectives,
Solomon chooses to play it safe, 20 never quite gets out of the orthodox box, 2 1 and still reverts to calls for strengthening IMF
loan conditionality which mandates downward structural ad22
justment for deficit countries.
The orthodox treatment of the growth in cross-border hot
money flows reflects a false dichotomy that pits the benefits of
private hot money liberalization against the dangers of controls
on private capital flows. 23 Such a dichotomy permits orthodox
thinkers to reposition themselves as enlightened reformers by
favoring a middle ground of cautious and sequenced liberalization to permit more stability in private investment flows. 24 But
18. Solomon, supra note 6, at 117.
19. Id., at 119, 127.
20. Solomon's discussion of the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad is confined to Mohamad's criticisms of Westerners in general and
speculators such as George Soros in particular. Id., at 131. Unfortunately,
there is barely a passing reference to Malaysia's experiment with exchange and
capital controls, Id., at 118, an experiment that flew in the face of the IMF's
orthodox neoliberal agenda and has proved itself to be largely successful.
Mahathir Mohamad, Call Me a Heretic If You Like, Time, Sept. 21, 1998, at 80.
21. For instance, in his chapter on "Economies in Transition," Solomon describes the financial liberalization throughout the former Soviet Union, but
fails to recognize how China has so far managed to avoid the fate of Russia by
limiting its dependence on hot money capital inflows. Solomon, supra note 6, at
105-06. Cf., Canova, supra note 3, at 1626 n. 230-31.
22. Solomon, supra note 6, at 129, 160.
23. Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed CriticalLegal Studies, L. & Social Inquiry 779, 820 (1993) (criticizing "the classic liberal division of
the realm of the possible into dichotomous choices").
24. See Press Conference of Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the
IMF, Washington, D.C., Sept. 30, 1999 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/
1999/TR990930.HTM>. As the European currency crises of the early 1990's
demonstrated, even sequenced liberalization can result in a country's eventual
vulnerability to hot money outflows, the erosion of banking and financial stabil-
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this dichotomy is false because it precludes any consideration of
the feasibility or even the legitimacy of public capital flows, such
as the very large transfer of surpluses that was accomplished
through the Marshall Plan following the Second World War. 25
By not addressing the so-called transfer problem with any discussion of public-sector grants, the only prescriptions left on the
table are ones that rely primarily on private recycling of capital
at high real interest rates. 2 6 The net result condemns deficit
countries to sudden outflows of private portfolio capital and the
of IMF-imposed austerity and structural adjustdismal prospect 27
ment programs.
Likewise, by repeating orthodox explanations of the hot
money surge into the U.S., 28 Solomon often ignores alternative
explanations, 29 and never reaches critical conclusions. 30 For exity, and significant downturns in economic growth and employment levels. See
Timothy A. Canova, The Swedish Model Betrayed, 37 Challenge, May-June
1994, at 36-40.
25. See Lawrence H. Summers, Buildingan InternationalFinancialArchitecture for the 21" Century, 18 Cato J. 321, 325 (Winter 1999) (using false dichotomy to ignore postwar history of public cross-border capital flows). See,
Canova, supra note 3, at 1638-41 (articulating an alternative development approach that relies on public capital transfers through the recycling of
surpluses).
26. Solomon was wrong in 1977 about the sustainability of private bank
recycling of petrodollars, precisely because he did not take into account the possibility of sharply rising interest rates. Solomon, supra note 6, at 36. Had the
recycling continued at low or even negative interest rates, the debt burden may
well have been sustainable.
27.

See IRwiN P. STOTZKY,

SILENCING THE

GuNs IN

HAITI: THE PROMISE OF

183-84, 267, n.178 (1997) (analyzing the burdens of
the IMF's privatization plan for Haiti).
28. Solomon repeats orthodox explanations for the continuing strength of
the U.S. dollar in the face of its twin budget and trade deficits: that foreign
investors were attracted to the dynamism of the U.S. economy, the growth in
U.S. gross domestic product, and surging corporate profits. Solomon, supra
note 6, at 12, 13 (reporting that private foreign purchases of U.S. securities
other than Treasury obligations rose from $1.6 billion in 1979 to $51 billion in
1985). But that does not answer why the inflow of capital into the U.S. has not
turned to sudden outflow as it has for all other countries experiencing a growing
trade deficit because of a booming domestic economy. In repeating a Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) observation, Solomon seems at a loss for a theory to fit the reality: "There is no parallel for this phenomenon of an ever
strengthening currency based on ever increasing capital inflows with the current account steadily deteriorating." Id., at 10.
29. One alternative explanation of the sustained surge in capital inflows is
that the U.S. is a special case precisely because its currency is the main reserve
currency in the world: while 70 percent of the U.S. current-account deficit was
financed by private capital inflows, "much of the rest is accounted for by inflows
of official capital as central banks abroad accumulated dollar reserves and used
them to acquire U.S. securities or deposits in American banks." Id., at 32.
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
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ample, he neglects to consider the unfairness of expecting other
deficit countries to swallow the IMF's austerity prescriptions of
downward adjustment when the greatest trade deficit country of
all time refuses such pain.3 1 Such neoliberal adjustment policies, including privatization plans, have served to enrich relatively small numbers of well-educated elites, while leaving vast
majorities with declining employment and income prospects, if
not in abject poverty. 3 2 While Solomon devotes a chapter to the
debt crisis confronting the less-developed countries,3 3 he again
accepts orthodox narratives that pin those debt problems on fac34
tors extraneous to the global financial system.
Solomon devotes a rather large portion of Money on the
Move to the economic and monetary integration of the European
Union. His great enthusiasm for the Euro is apparent in his
speculations about the Euro's future prospects for private capital markets. 35 Again, Solomon displays a great command of the
subject matter and effectively relates the most important historical events. But as with his discussion of capital mobility and
the debt crisis, Solomon here too falls short in linking policy developments (such as the liberalization of capital flows) to declining commitments of governments around the world to objectives
of full employment and equitable distributions of wealth and
income. 3 6
30. While Solomon finds it surprising that "exchange markets have, to a
large extent, come to ignore [U.S.] current-account imbalances," he has argued
in the past that the appreciating dollar resulted from speculation, including
political speculation. Id., at 30, 137.
31. Reagan's Treasury Secretary James Baker gave a slight nod in the direction of changing the burdens of adjustment when he urged surplus countries
to speed up their economic growth or face the prospect of a U.S.-engineered
competitive depreciation of the dollar. Id., at 24.
32. MELTDOWN 267, 277-78 (ed., William Krehm, 1999).
33. When Solomon applauds the spread of democracy he means liberal
(and neoliberal) democracy, not social democracy with its traditional concern
with full employment and fair distributions of wealth, income, and power. Solomon, supra note 6, at 34.
34. Solomon's narrative on the Third-World Debt crisis blames the oil
shocks for the outbreak of the debt crisis. Id., at. 36-37. Actually, it could be
traced to the earlier devaluation of the dollar, which spurred OPEC to cartelize
and raise prices, since their revenues were denominated in dollars. LYNN
TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM 26 (1996) (suggesting that the rise in speculative finance led to exchange rate fluctuations, changes in commodity prices,
and deterioration in the terms of trade of developing countries).
35. Solomon, supra note 6, at 91-92. All but forgotten in Solomon's account
of European monetary integration are the prospects for public capital
development.
36. For instance, Solomon ably describes the "snake" in the "tunnel," the
metaphor for how European currencies fluctuated against each other within a
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For instance, in discussing the development of the European System of Central Banks, Solomon falls victim to another
false dichotomy, one that again permits orthodox thinkers to position themselves as reformers, even while accepting a type of
reform that condemns full employment policies to the sidelines.
According to this dichotomous thinking, an independent European central bank modeled after the independent
Bundesbank and Federal Reserve - was the only alternative to
either destabilizing freely floating exchange rates or the "complete domination of Germany's Bundesbank over Europe's monetary policy." 37 But, of course, there were other alternatives,

namely the creation of a European central bank accountable to
the European Council of Ministers and European Parliament.
As Solomon points out, the 1991 Maastricht Treaty affirmed in
principle the objective of the new European System of Central
Banks as supporting "a high level of employment and of social
protection." 38 However, he fails to fully grasp the way that the
structure and policies of an autonomous European central bank
and the treaty's "convergence criteria" of low budget deficits, low
inflation, and converging interest rates undermined full employ39
ment throughout the continent.
narrow band, and he recognizes that one effect of the elimination of exchange
and capital controls was the rise of speculative currency attacks, but does not
recognize the rise in hot money flows as a major constraint on full employment
policy. Id., at 50, 55. Solomon also reports on the complaints by French Finance Minister Balladur that the European Exchange Rate Mechanism's fixed
exchange rates led to asymmetrical burdens of adjustment which permitted
"surplus countries to go on accumulating reserves, but those in deficit were limited by the size of their reserves and the need to repay credits." Id., at 61. But
Solomon fails to offer real criticism of the proposed solution, the formation of a
monetary union and an independent European central bank, which has only
exacerbated the burdens on all countries, deficit as well as surplus countries.
37. Id., at 64 (quoting Charles Wyplosz).
38. Id., at 67. Maastricht's empty rhetoric resembles similar affirmations
of full employment in the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment and Balanced
Growth Act, passed into law by the U.S. Congress only two years before the
Federal Reserve, under Paul Volcker, embarked on its high real interest rate
policy that effectively eviscerated hopes for full employment. See WILLIAM
GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE 96, 123 (1987) (describing the HumphreyHawkins Act as "an empty symbol" and "the last legislative gasp of the Keynesian persuasion").
39. Solomon, supra note 6, at 79. Solomon's description of the European
currency crises of the early 1990's, therefore, reads as a passing blip on the way
to financial stability, without appreciation of the human carnage in terms of
high levels of unemployment that persist to this day. Id., at 67-77. His description of the political battles (such as the Emminger letter) reads as a tug of war
over exchange rate policy, when the political stakes are much higher because of
the repercussions in terms of recessionary conditions and mass unemployment.
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Despite its shortcomings, Money on the Move is an impressive work that would make an excellent background primer for
courses in the area of international finance and may provide a
useful model to teach against. But it has far more limited application as a guide for future policy. Solomon discusses several
reform proposals, including proposals to increase the allocation
of Special Drawing Rights, 40 and a possible Tobin tax on global
financial transactions to throw sand in the gears of the speculators. 4 1 But his ambivalence shows through. Ultimately he concludes that any far-reaching reforms are politically unattainable
or practicably unenforceable, reflecting in part the disappearance of law from present-day discourses about the liberalization
of capital. 4 2 Such defeatist conclusions - that there is no alternative 4 3 - sadly define the limits of reform by defining the limits of the orthodox imagination.
The limits of the conventional economic orthodoxy have become synonymous with the Washington consensus, the neoliberal policy prescriptions pushed by the IMF and the U.S.
Treasury Department. Solomon repeats the oft-cited example of
Chile's economic success in the 1980's. 44 According to the orthodox narrative, Chile became a "role model," one of the first lessdeveloped countries to successfully follow the orthodox prescripInstead, Solomon accepts as fact the dominant though unsubstantiated conclusion that "most" of Europe's high unemployment is "structural," by which he
means high labor costs, taxes and non-wage benefits, rather than the structure
of income distribution, consumption and production, or the increasingly autonomous structure of central banks. Therefore, according to Solomon's line of
thinking, high levels of unemployment should require cuts in wages and public
sector benefit programs. Id., at 94. See also, IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Sweden, Public Information Notice No. 99/87, Sept. 2, 1999 <httpJ/
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1999/PN9987.HTM> (arguing in favor of structural reforms that undermine wage solidarity and reduce unemployment
benefits).
40. The Special Drawing Rights (SDR) is a global currency that was created by the IMF, first issued in 1970, and used as a reserve asset. Canova,
supra note 3, at 1633-36; Solomon, supra note 6, at 154-55.
41. Solomon, supra note 6, at 150-52; Canova, supra note 3, at 1629-32.
42. Solomon's rejection of fundamental reform is reflected in the narrow
scope of consideration of reform proposals, which he confines to questions of
free floating versus fixed exchange rates versus currency boards, while excluding discussion about changing the burdens of adjustment. Solomon, supra note
6, at 166-67. See also, Canova, supra note 3, at 1636-43.

43. See DANIEL

SINGER, WHOSE MILLENNIUM? THEIRS OR OuRs?

(1999) (re-

porting that former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher used the phrase
"There is no alternative" so often that her opponents took to calling her by the
acronym "TINA").
44. Solomon, supra note 6, at 44-45.
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tions. 4 5 There is, of course, another way to view such consensus
policies and Chile's initial success 46 with neoliberal policies: in
a world in which capital is kept artificially scarce and the
growth of domestic and global liquidity is constrained, private
capital flows will reward those countries that pursue socially regressive policies while punishing those that pursue full employment and social progress. 4 7 The combination of the
liberalization of capital flows along with the decimation of public-sector development efforts (such as Marshall Plan-types of
global capital transfers) has resulted in the empowering of private financial prerogatives. Unfortunately, such privatization of
development policy has also served to disempower democratically-elected governments, thereby undermining the employment and income prospects of millions of peoples around the
48
world.
The global currency contagion, the economic crisis in Japan
and much of the rest of East Asia, the sudden collapse of the
Russian ruble, and the gyrations of western financial markets,
49
have shaken - though not broken - the orthodox consensus.
For now, many orthodox economists continue to proclaim the
success of their policies, and to counsel patience and slow incremental reform. But their measure of success - that countries
remain financially solvent, even while their people suffer
profound economic and social hardship as a result of neoliberal
structural adjustment policies - is not just short-sighted and
narrow, but actually amoral in its studied neglect of the human
45. Id., at 115.
46. While Chile has used controls on short-term capital inflows to protect
itself from speculative attack, by mid-1998 the fallout from the region's currency contagion had started to take a toll on the Chilean economy. Canova,
supra note 3, at 1621. Argentina, also once hailed as a successful neoliberal
model, has also fallen on tough times as a result of the fallout from the region's
currency contagion. Id., at 1601-02, 1644-45.
47. Keynes, supra note 1, at 376 (arguing that while "there may be intrinsic reasons for the scarcity of land, there are no intrinsic reasons for the scarcity
of capital").
48. See Paul Lewis, World Bank Says Poverty Is Increasing, N.Y. Times,
June 3, 1999, at C7 (the number of people living on less than $1 per day rose
from 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion from 1987 to 1999); Global Financial Crisis Will
Trigger Jump in World Unemployment, Press Release on the International Labour Organization World Employment Report, 1998-99, Sept. 24, 1998 <http:/ /
www.ilo.org/public/english/235press/pr/1998/33.html> (more than one billion
people, representing one-third of the world's labor force, are either unemployed
or employed in below-poverty-wage jobs).
49. See David E. Sanger, U.S. and I.M.F. Made Asia Crisis Worse, World
Bank Finds, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1998, at Al (reporting on the embarrassing
and growing split in today's orthodoxy).
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suffering that results from the neoliberal project.5 0 The real
human tragedy of today's prevailing orthodoxy is the way that
neoliberal economic policies systematically deprive people of
their individual dignity by condemning them to joblessness, underemployment, and poverty-wage conditions.
In an increasingly global economy, such dire conditions in
submerging markets will threaten wage levels, labor and living
standards everywhere, including in the United States. The
World Trade Organization (WTO) and its critics beyond the
streets of 1999 Seattle will remain locked in a no-win debate
over such "race to the bottom" issues as long as the only alternatives for Third World development are private hot money capital
flows or no investment at all. With such artificially limited alternatives, the Third World will usually choose fickle finance
over no credit at all. But if development depends on scarce private capital, then by definition there will not be enough investment capital to go around. And if there are insufficient levels of
development capital, then Third World elites will always side
with First World elites in the WTO in choosing unrestricted free
trade over minimum labor standards. 5 ' Orthodox thinking refuses to acknowledge that we have other alternatives 52 : namely,
sensible restrictions on private hot money flows, along with sizable increases in public capital flows that recycle the world's mas50. U.S. economic growth seems increasingly dependent on continued private capital inflows and a regressive penal Keynesianism that effectively locks
up those who drop out of the labor market. Turgeon, supra note 34, at 73 (criticizing the rise in unemployment, and consequent rise in mass incarceration, as
a lever to control inflation); MELTDOWN, supra note 32, at 190-91; Eric
Schlosser, The Prison-IndustrialComplex, The Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 1998, at
51.
51. For instance, at the WTO's Third Ministerial meeting in Seattle, U.S.
labor unions urged the Clinton administration to press the WTO to allow members to impose trade sanctions on other nations that violate basic worker's
rights like prohibitions on child labor and the right to form trade unions. But
India, Brazil and Egypt took the lead for the developing world in blocking the
creation of a WTO advisory panel on labor standards that they feared could
eventually lead to trade sanctions over violations of labor rights. Steven Greenhouse and Joseph Kahn, U.S. Efforts to Add Labor Standardsto Agenda Fails,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1999, at Al, A12. The Clinton administration retreated
toward a compromise European Union proposal "to set up a group outside the
WTO to study the link between trade and labor rights." Id. First World and
Third World elites may fear that such a study group would recognize the
mounting evidence of a significant causal relationship between unrestricted hot
money capital mobility and oppressive labor conditions and declining living
standards.
52. 'We have other alternatives" (WHOA!) is an appropriate rejoinder for
those who see the false confines of the mantra that "There is no alternative"
(TINA). See note 43 supra.

20001

COMMENTARY

sive surpluses of monetary reserves, to build a foundation for
minimum labor standards and rising wage levels around the
world.
Solomon's Money on the Move represents a real contribution
to global financial studies by providing an excellent description
and chronology of recent events in global markets. It may ultimately prove to be an important milestone in Solomon's intellectual development as well. After all, Solomon appears
ambivalent and guardedly skeptical, if not quite critical, of recent trends in the global financial system, including capital account liberalization, the rise of speculation, the ascendancy of
monetary policy (as "the only game in town"), and the neutralization of fiscal policy. 5 3 His orthodoxy, tempered by mildly reformist inclinations, resembles the Keynes of the early Treatise
on Money, in which Keynes largely accepted neoclassical views
concerning the dependence of investment upon savings. Keynes,
of course, later developed his profoundly anti-orthodox General
Theory and constructed the architecture of the Bretton Woods
Agreement, which together provided the theoretical justification
and practical blueprint for government intervention and controls to promote and maintain full employment. 5 4 Unlike
Keynes, Solomon has yet to break convincingly from the conventional orthodoxy of his day. But until more economists are willing to imagine alternative visions of progressive institutional
reform, public discussion of global finance will remain trapped
in a conformity that serves the interests of the few while
preventing a great many individuals from achieving the dignity
that we are all due.

53.

See note 5 supra; Solomon, supra note 6, at 22, 139, 142.

54. See Lynn Turgeon, The PoliticalEconomy of Reparations,New German
Critique 111, 115 (Winter 1973) (arguing that the later Keynes recognized the

central importance of the "transfer" problem of how to structure global institutional arrangements to ensure that surplus monetary reserves are adequately
recycled or transferred in a manner that promotes full employment in both surplus and deficit countries).

